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Social spending is a large and controversial program within the United States.  Though a 
number of studies examined its effects on Gross Domestic Product (“GDP”) between countries, 
very few specifically looked at its effectiveness solely within the United States. By doing so, 
international political policy deviations are controlled for. Further, most studies neglect the 
externalities of social spending on living standards.  This paper fills these gaps by utilizing two US 
Census aid data sets – state & local spending and federal aid & transfer payments – for all 50 
states to study the effects of social spending on Gross Domestic Product, Income, and Personal 
Consumption Expenditures 
 Using two-stage residual inclusion estimation, the analysis first predicts social spending 
variables using its lags and Gross Domestic Product, Income, or Personal Consumption.  In the 
second stage, the first-stage residuals predict Gross Domestic Product, Income, or Personal 
Consumption.  Using this method, the short-term positive marginal benefits were found for 
Housing (≈$12 on GDP and income), Incapacity (≈$3 on income), Workers’ Compensation (≈$31 
on GDP and income) and Other (≈$1.75 on income and personal consumption) spending. 
Negative effects were found to varying degrees on GDP, income and personal consumption for 
Family, Health, Labor, Unemployment and Old Age spending.  Most variables were consistent 
between the two datasets and with prior studies.  However, differences in the direction from 
prior studies of the effect on Gross Domestic Product arose for Health, Old Age and 
Unemployment.   
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 Additionally, this paper looks into the interplay of politics with social spending.  In 
particular, how particular years, the political party and gubernatorial turnover are related to 
social spending and its effects on both the economy and standards of living.  Both Labor and 







 Since Franklin D. Roosevelt introduced the New Deal in 1933, social spending, in one 
form or another, has been a significant government program in the United States, and yet, 
despite its longevity, the expenditure of public funds has remained a topic of constant debate.  
On one side, some argue that the United States is unfairly providing too many handouts at the 
expense of hardworking individuals, other government programs, businesses, and the rich.  
Simultaneously, others claim that social spending maintains a minimum standard of living and 
subsistence, increases buying power, and reduces crime.  These positions stem from one’s 
political attitudes, demographic background, and religious inclinations, in addition to the varying 
degrees of generosity, inclusiveness, and attitudes toward redistribution fostered by the same 
(Huber, Mustillo& Stephens, 2008).  For liberals and conservatives, the resounding constant 
question is not just one of how to spend the money, but whether the government receives a 
positive return on its investment beyond the noble self-satisfaction and venerable social flattery 
provided to the politicians and their constituents.  This paper seeks to place a tangible monetary 
value on social spending for a better society, particularly within the United States. 
 With one side saying yes to social spending and another side saying no, it is first 
important to establish how to measure a positive return.  The stereotypical conservative will 
tend to focus on the economic return, while the liberal focuses on social returns.  This paper will 
look at both by examining short-term effects of social spending on three different variables.  
These are Gross Domestic Product (“GDP”), income, and personal consumption.  (The collection 
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of these dependent variables will here in be referred to as the “Macro Dependent Variables” 
[Table 1].)  GDP focuses on the total economic performance gains as a result of social spending, 
while income and consumption highlight the economic gains in human well-being as a result of 
social spending programs.  The theoretical economic impact of social spending on GDP should 
feature increases in demand via public consumption by investing in low-income individuals, 
increases in output through employment and increases in human capital through health 
funding.  Potential decreases on output exist through retirement induced labor reductions and 
invalidity benefits (Furceri & Zdzienicka, 2012).  In addition to the direct economic benefits of 
GDP, analysis of income and personal consumption expenditures (“PCE”) give insight into the 
living standards of individuals through their spending habits.  Together, these variables should 
provide a well-rounded view into the national externalities of social spending. 
  Prior research into the effects of social spending has traditionally focused on GDP, with 
little attention paid to changes in standards of living.  Additionally, these studies have 
overwhelmingly been conducted at an international level.  In particular, a disproportionate 
amount of research has centered on countries within the Organization for Economic 
Cooperation and Development (“OECD”), although one study did feature countries within Latin 
America while another focused solely within Canada.  Surprisingly, only one study, Horváth et al. 
(2014), specifically examined states’ GDP within the United States.  Further, the analysis of social 
spending on consumption, providing insight into living standards, is unprecedented, as annual 
statewide consumption data from 1997 to 2012 was released for the first time in August 2014.  
The broad range of social and economic variability from international analysis may provide a 
greater range of data, but it simultaneously obscures finer details.  By exclusively contemplating 
social policies within the United States, this paper will help politicians interpret the impact of 
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internal social programs’ costs through the lens of our own unique social and economic 
construct. 
  Traditionally, papers have highlighted nine areas of social spending, not due to any 
particular insight, but due to the manner of OECP data collection.   State census data, available 
via two different sets, is not provided in the same format.  The first set, a combination of state 
and local data(“State and Local Data”), compiled in Table 2,  focuses on broad areas of spending 
and state contributions, while the second set (“Federal Data”), compiled in Table 3,emphasizes 
particular federal aid programs which redistribute money to states through various government 
programs and transfer payments to individuals.  The Federal Data combines government 
spending into eight (as opposed to nine) categories which directly mirror the OECD studies.  The 
two datasets, though overlapping, offer slightly different insights; for example, the State and 
Local Data includes education, which Federal Data excludes.  To prevent endogeneity, an 
instrumental variable (“IV”) approach, building on the work of Furceri and Zdzienicka(2012), 
uses residuals of each variable of interest as the IV for regression.   
 The results showed positive short-term economic impacts on the GDP, income, and PCE 
from Housing, Incapacity, Workers’ Compensation and Other.  Housing and Workers’ 
Compensation showed the largest and most significant effect.  Family, Health, Labor, 
Unemployment, and Old Age all showed negative effects1.  Labor spending had the largest short-
term negative effect.  The only variable to show both positive and negative effects on the range 
of dependent variables was Education spending.   
The remainder of this paper explores past and present methods, impacts and 
observations of social spending.  Section II gives a detailed literature review on prior work done 
                                                          
1
 All variables are capitalized throughout the paper.  For clarity of combined insight, variables from both 
data sets of similar composition use the same name.  When necessary, this paper will specify the data set 
with which a particular variable is associated.  
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by authors on related topics.  Section III goes over data relevance and sources.  Section IV 
reviews the methodology used, while Section V presents the empirical analysis and raw results.  
Section VI expands on the findings by spending category and offers additional insights.  Finally, 









Past literature on social spending has focused primarily on returns in GDP to determine 
its effects, with the majority of the literature indicating some form of positive returns to GDP 
(Furceri & Zdzienicka, 2012; Gupta, Clements & Tiongson, 1998; Huber, Mustillo & Stephens, 
2008; Clemente, Marcuello & Montañes, 2012; Wang, 2005; and Stenberg et al., 2014).  Other 
authors have cited specific areas of the economy in which social spending increases economic 
returns.  These areas include increases in private output (Fatas & Mihov 2001), stabilization of 
the economy (Furceri, 2010), and an increase in economic risk taking (Bird, 2000).  Many studies 
have shown that investments in social spending create a positive economic return in GDP, but 
vary in degree.  The expansionary effects of social spending on the economy has been noted by 
Fatas & Mihov (2001) as being greater than one and by Furceri & Zdzienicka (2012) at about 0.6.  
However, Lindert (1996, 2004) states that variations in social spending across nations has not 
led to slower growth or lower incomes among nations spending 10-33% of GDP on welfare 
programs.  But what is the best course of action?  When it comes to social spending, how much 
and where should we be investing? 
It is important to look at not just the agglomerated dollar amount of social spending, but 
also its individual components (Wang, 2005).  Typical categorization of welfare programs in 
OECD studies have been old age, survivors, incapacity, health, family, active labor market, 
unemployment, housing and other (Furceri 2010 and Furceri & Zdzienicka, 2012).   Prior 
literature has found that those programs in which social spending  has had the most positive 
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influence on GDP have been old age, health and unemployment, though survivors and education 
have been mentioned as well (Fatas & Mihov, 2001; Furceri, 2010; Furceri & Zdzienicka, 2012; 
Huber et al., 2008; Wang, 2005).  The preferred method of implementing these variables into 
regressions has been as a percentage of GDP, and is sometimes called welfare effort (Olaskoaga-
Larrauri, Aláez-Aller, & Díaz-De-Basurto, 2009). 
  The most common indicator of successful welfare programs has been GDP; it is simple 
and easily understood.  Yet, despite GDP’s obvious benefits, it may not be the best or only 
indicator of successful government social spending.  GDP ignores wealth variation, income 
flows, household produced services, destruction of the environment, and determinants of well 
being (Fleurbaey, 2009).  In other research, Huber et al. incorporated GDP per capita as an 
independent variable for social spending; indicating social spending varies with economic 
outcomes and therefore requires other indicators of success.  Fleurbaey (2009), Escosura (2010) 
and Gupta et al. (1998) focus on effects of human development.  Specifically, Fleurbaey states 
that human development, or rather “knowledge and…access to resources needed for a decent 
standard of living,” is a better indicator of success for developing countries as it can lead to 
future economic gains.  However, the American Human Development Report, which captures 
state data, is biennial and only goes back to 2009; making it a poor indicator of human well 
being for this study.  Instead, household income and PCE are used as they more closely mirror 
material living standards than GDP (Stiglitz, Sen, & Fitoussi, 2009).  Both GDP and human 
welfare, which can lead to future economic gains, are examined as indicators of social spending 
success. 
The majority of work on social spending and its relationship to GDP has focused on 
country level data, particularly within the OECD countries.  Though some authors have focused 
on other country groups like the Gulf Cooperation Council of countries (Al-Faris, 2002) and Latin 
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America (Huber et al., 2008), these studies are few.  Data within countries is even harder to find.  
Wang (2005) is one of the few authors who explores domestic data, examining empirical 
evidence in health and education from Canada.  Only one study specifically compared state level 
data across the United States, Horváth et al. (2014), which analyzed GDP effects across 
departments.  There, they found that spending by the Department of Health and Human 
Services and the Department of Labor have negative effects, while outlays by the Department of 
Commerce and the Department of Interior have positive effects.  Unlike these papers that solely 
examine state social spending effects on GDP, this paper also captures the impacts on human 
development through analysis of income and personal consumption expenditures. 
 When comparing countries, there are numerous differences at play affecting the 
outcomes of social policies on GDP.  These differences both aid and hinder analysis.  Bird (2000) 
notes that “sufficient variation in Welfare State measures…requires a dataset that crosses major 
jurisdictional boundaries” (pp. 358).  However, by focusing within a country, we can examine a 
finer level of regional politics and philosophies at play in social spending outcomes that meet 
national expectations with regional implementation.  Huber et al. (2008) notes when analyzing 
data for Latin America that modifications have to be made from the typical OECD country 
analysis.  The same is true in analyzing state data due to local level politics, economies, culture, 
and more significantly, available data.   
 Implementation will follow in the footsteps of Clement et al. (2012) and Furceri & 
Zdzienicka (2012).  These analyses focus on a range of social variables while examining not only 
the effects in GDP, including its multiplier effect, but also effects on investment and the private 
sector.  They include different income levels, income elasticity, unit roots for time series 
properties and account for possible reverse causation of GDP to deliver a robust analysis.   
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 Likewise, we cannot neglect that an increase in GDP leads to more money available for 
expanding the role of government and increasing social spending (Al-Faris, 2002).  It is also 
sensitive to the “ups and downs of economic growth” (Clement et al., 2012).  An increase in GDP 
will potentially lead to reverse causation.   Furceri & Zdzienicka (2012) address this by identifying 
government-spending shocks and estimating a policy rule for social spending, while many other 
authors seem to ignore the possible effects of endogeneity.   
  Overall, this paper seeks to add value to the existing literature by finding the social 
policies that are best in advancing the general welfare of the United States, not countries in 
general, through their short-term impacts on GDP, income and PCE.  Additionally, it provides 
insight on, not just economic, but political influences of social policies.  The results hope to 









State GDP data comes from the Bureau of Economic Analysis (“BEA”) and is given in 
both total and per capita terms.  Though the data goes back to 1987, there is a discontinuity in 
the data in 1997 when data collection changed from the Standard Industrial Classification (“SIC”) 
to the North American Industry Classification System (“NAICS”).  NAICS, the newer data set, is 
more consistent with US GDP definitions2.  Further, state PCE data is only available from 1997-
2012.  Due to GDP data standardization differences and PCE data availability, analysis is 
restricted from 1997 onward.  GDP, based on NAICS data, is given in 2009 dollars and all other 
data is converted to 2009 dollars to match.   
Social spending data is taken from three US Census Bureau sources.  State and Local 
Data comes from the State and Local Government Finances of the Census of Governments, 
sorted by state, which provides information on the structure, function, finances, and 
employment of over 90,000 state and local governments.  The applicable social spending data, 
in the expenditure section, divides the data into general areas, those of interest include: 
Education, Employee Retirement, Health, housing & community development (“Housing”), 
Social Insurance, Unemployment, veteran services (“Veteran”), Welfare, Workers’ 
Compensation and other insurance trusts (“Other”)3.  A concern with government finance data 
                                                          
2
 The BEA states “there are differences in source data and different estimation methodologies. This data 
discontinuity may affect both the levels and the growth rates of GDP by state. Users of GDP by state are 
strongly cautioned against appending the two data series in an attempt to construct a single time series 
for 1963 to 2014.  For more information visit http://www.bea.gov/regional/docs/product/. 
3
 For a full list of applicable welfare variables from State and Local Government Finances see Table 2. 
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is that many state governments have different fiscal years, not only from federal fiscal years, but 
also from each other.  The use of lagged data minimizes these differences.   
The data described above does not provide insight on how federal aid was allocated to 
the federal programs within the state.  Section 8 (of the annual Statistical Abstracts produced by 
the US Census Bureau) includes a table for Federal Aid to State and Local Governments by State 
for the most recent years, which shows how federal aid was allocated among states for specific 
programs such as Women, Infants, and Children; Head Start; No Child Left Behind; Medicare & 
Medicaid; and others4.  This data, in conjunction with the US Census Bureau’s Government 
Transfer Payments to Individuals by State data from Section 11 of the annual Statistical 
Abstracts, are the sources for Federal Data.  Government transfer payments include information 
on retirement & disability insurance, medical payments, income maintenance benefits, 
unemployment benefits, veteran’s benefits, federal education & training assistance, and other.  
To mirror the OECD spending variables in other studies, these two federal datasets are 
combined by examining the OECD database5; specifically the composition of variables that make 
up United States social spending.  For each category of social spending, matching variables from 
the Federal Aid and Transfer Payment dataset and the Transfer Payments to Individuals dataset 
were applied (Table 3). 
Data comprising State and Local Data as well as Federal Data are not mixed when 
regressing due to high levels of multicollinearity that exist between them.  This is because much 
of the data represents opposite ends, allocation and distribution, of the same programs.  As 
such, separate regression analyses for each dataset were performed. 
                                                          
4
 For a complete list of the welfare programs from the table Federal Aid to State and Local Governments 
by State, which is included in Section 8 of the US Census Bureau Statistical Abstract, see Table 3 
5




  Prior studies have generally divided social spending into nine categories because of how 
the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) formatted their statistics.  
These included old age, survivors, incapacity related, health, family, active labor market 
program, unemployment benefits, housing, and other policy areas (Furceri & Zdzienicka, 2012).  
While the US Census does not summarize its data in this manner, the combination of its 
categories can be distributed, for Federal Data, such that it encompasses the same OECD 
categories, with the exception of the survivor category.    
 In addition to GDP as a dependent variable, which may have endogeneity with social 
spending, personal consumption expenditure and income growth are used.  These provide a 
second, and arguably better (Stiglitz, Sen, & Fitoussi, 2009), reference of human well-being than 
GDP.  Furceri & Zdzienicka (2012) found that social spending had positive effects on 
consumption using OECD country level data.  They also noted that the welfare component of 
expenditure, in relation to economic activity, is largely ignored in the literature.  The BEA 
released data on Personal Consumption Expenditures by State for the first time on August 7, 
2014 as prototype estimates and covers the years 1997 to 2012 (in nominal dollars).  The BEA 
also provides data on state income through quarterly news releases compiled via online 
interactive tables.     
 An introductory analysis of the data is provided in Figures 1, 2 and 3, which compare 
State and Local Data from the State and Local Government Finances to state GDP.  From these 
graphs we can see an obvious correlation between GDP and social spending.  The first graph, 
Figure 1, shows states with higher social spending, the left side of the graph, also have 
comparatively higher GDPs.  Likewise, in Figure 2, we plot each state’s social spending and GDP 
by year.  An OLS regression on this data has a highly significant (0.1%) and very positive upward 
12 
 
trend coefficient of 4.66 indicating that for each dollar spent on welfare, GDP increases by 
$4.66.  The R2 is 0.3642.   
 
Figure 1.  Mean State Welfare Spending Per Capita & Mean GDP per Capita, 1997─2012  
 
Figure 2.  State and Local Government Finances vs Same Year GDP, 1997─2012 
 
Regressing with the differences (Figure 3), using the second lag of all social spending 



























































































































































































































































































































































Total State Welfare Spending per Capita values consist of variables listed in Table 2 and are drawn from the US Census "State and Local Government Finances".
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less than 0.1, and and R2 of 0.0445. Though these graphs do not prove causation, the correlation 
is apparent and warrants the study of this paper.  
 
Figure 3.  Two Lags of Difference in State and Local Government Finances vs GDP, 1997─2012 
 
 As discussed earlier, final data analysis on the Macro Dependent Variables, in per capita 
terms, is executed in two main groups: State and Local Data and Federal Data.  State and Local 
Data spending utilizes State and Local Government Finances variables with no modification.  This 
includes Education, Employee Retirement, Health, Housing & Community Development, Social 
Insurance, Unemployment, Veteran Services, Welfare, and Workers’ Compensation (Table 2).  
The Federal spending analysis combines both the Federal Aid to States and Federal Transfer 
Payments to Individuals into variables that mirror the international OECD analyses.  These 
include: Family, Health, Housing, Incapacity, Labor, Old Age, Unemployment, and Other (Table 
3).  By executing the analysis in groups, we avoid the endogenity issues outlined earlier.   
 Control variables (Table 4) focus on both the population and the economy.  These 
include population growth, distribution, unemployment, educational attainment, and income 
shares.  In addition, variables for gubernatorial party in power, governor turnover and voting 
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The empirical methodology employed follows and builds on standards set by previous 
authors (Clemente et al, 2012; Lindert, 1996; Wang, 2005).  The equations below are based 
primarily on the OECD country-level social spending to GDP analysis used by Furceri & 
Zdzienicka (2012); who themselves reference Romer & Romer (1989) to estimate the impacts of 
public spending on output.  This equation set was chosen for its proven use in prior literature 
and its ability to isolate effects of the dependent variable, whereby social spending is treated as 
a shock to the Macro Dependent Variable.  Succinctly, the following equations use the lags of 
the change in social spending variable and the change in the per capita Macro Dependent 
Variables to predict the change in each social spending variable.  Finally, to predict changes in 
the Macro Dependent Variables, the residuals of the change in the social spending variables are 
used.  In doing so, the possibility of reverse-causation from the Macro Dependent Variables on 
the variable of interest, social spending, is controlled for.   
The basic model, equation (1), is based on a simple dynamic growth model with social 
spending as the independent variable of interest.  The inclusion of lags of the dependent 
variable corrects for autocorrelation, while differencing the equation addresses omitted variable 
bias and removes time invariant factors.  This is modeled below: 
 










The parameter of interest,  , reflects the impact of a vector of social spending, s, on GDP per 
Capita (“GDPpC”), y.  In addition, b are time-fixed effects, β corrects for autocorrelation, X 
contains a vector of control variables which can affect short term growth, and   is the error 
term.  Prior to finding the difference equation (1), fixed effects were split between state and 
time to account for consistent output by state that is non-time dependent (state-fixed effect) 
and changes in national policy that vary each year, but are constant for each state (time-fixed 
effect) .  State-fixed effects cancel out with the difference equation, but since time-fixed effects 
are time-variant, they remain in the equation6.  The X vector contains data such as political 
party, growth of the surrounding states, and population growth.   
 The primary problem with equation (1) is the potential for endogeneity between GDP 
and social spending as either more money becomes available or as policy makers attempt to 
stabilize the economy.  This is primarily due to the flow of reverse causation, which given by 
equation (2).  Estimations of fiscal reaction functions by Darby and Melitz (2008) found social 
spending to be counter-cyclical to GDP.  This indicates that   < 0.  With opposite signs for social 
spending and growth, this implies     is biased downward (Furceri & Zdzienicka, 2012), which 
could result in zero or negative results in OLS estimations for social spending on GDP even if the 
actual effect is positive.   
 
(2) ∆    =   ∆    +     
 
Furceri & Zdzienicka (2012) parallel other growth studies by developing a fiscal reaction 
function, equation (3).  Here we will estimate social spending for each state instead of by 
country. 
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+ ∅ʹ   +    
 
In this policy equation, we have a time trend and a vector Z, which controls for various state and 
population attributes, including the initial state debt to GDP ratio, initial ratio of social spending 
to GDP, income distributions (using the Gini or Theil Indexes), gubernatorial turnover, 
significance of voting years, and age & race distributions.  The lagged values of social spending 
account for the normal dynamics of the series (Romer and Romer, 1989) and include both linear 
and exponential effects to allow for initial short term increases and then decreases as its 
spending fluctuates.  An evaluation of each regression of social spending using the Breusch-
Pagan Lagrange multiplier, to test for state random effects, and the Hausman test, to compare 
state fixed and random effects, was performed.  In all cases, the pooled OLS, with year fixed 
effects, was the best regression.   
 Time fixed-effects, in both equation (1) and (3) address national changes in the economy 
for the given year.  Its inclusion addresses national business cycles as well as changes to federal 
law, policy, trade, and other factors influencing the economics of all 50 states. 
To correct for reverse causation, there are two possible methods.  The first is to use a 
two stage IV approach.  In this method, Lindert (1996) suggests using non-GDP related 
determinants of social spending, including income effects, electoral variables, and age 
distribution.  These IVs attempt to capture the type of person that idealizes a need for social 
spending within their communities.  Despite Lindert’s conclusions, many of the variables in this 
paper’s data had effects on GDP in the short term. 
The second method is a form of two-stage residual inclusion estimation introduced by 
Furceri & Zdzienicka (2012).  The residuals from the OLS regression represent the portion of 
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social spending not effected by GDP.  By replacing the independent variable for social spending, 
s, from equation (1) with the residuals,  , of equation (3), the short-term impact of social 
spending on GDP can be estimated with one direction of causation.  The residuals act as a 
pseudo instrumental variable, having been predicted from GDP, but not related to GDP.  When 
tested for possible correlation with the other independent variables, X, the residuals showed a 
correlation of under 0.1 for the strong majority of the variables and their lags; the most 
common variables to show a correlation greater than 0.1, though still rarely exceeding 0.2, 
included the population of black individuals, the Gini coefficient, and Voting Year.  The 
parameter of interest remains  . 
 






+  ʹ    +     
 
Though GDPpC is a known and reliable indicator of economic performance, as we noted earlier, 
it is not the best indication of human well-being.  To acquire a fuller picture of the effects of 
social spending on our society, we model Equation (5) for Income per Capita (“IpC”) and 
Equation (6) for PCE per Capita (“PCEpC”) after Equation (4). 
 
(5) ∆    =   













(6) ∆    =    













The control variables, both the X and Z vectors, come from the same pool of control 
variables.  The control variables, Z, utilized in predicting each social spending variable are 
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repeated, though only if significant, in the X vector of the equations (4), (5), and (6) for the 
Macro Dependent Variables.  New ones are then added to better predict growth.  By doing so, 
we factor out the potential correlation between the controls and the social spending variables 









 Results are presented in two sections.  Section V.1 includes results from State and Local 
Data’s government finances and Section V.2 is the results from Federal Data (the combination of 
Federal Aid and Individual Transfer Payments) finances. 
V.1. State and Local Government Finances 
 The government finance areas, from State and Local Data, of Education, Social 
Insurance, Unemployment, and Workers’ Compensation had an effect on two or more of the 
Macro Dependent Variables.  The areas of Health, Housing, Retirement, and Veteran spending 
had an effect on only one Macro Dependent Variable.  Welfare spending was not significant on 
any Macro Dependent Variable regression. 
The first stage process predicted social spending, using equation (3), for each social 
spending category based on past spending, additional independent variables, and lags of the 
Macro Dependent Variables. To avoid correlation and to factor out the effects of GDP and 
Income/PCE independently, such that the appropriate residuals in the second stage regressions 
on each Macro Dependent Variable are used, regressions of each Macro Dependent Variable are 
done separately and divided between two tables (Table 5 and 6).   Table 5 is spending 
predictions utilizing GDPpC, but not IpC or PCEpC as an independent variable.  Table 6 is 
spending predictions utilizing IpC and/or PCEpC, but not GDPpC as an independent variable.  
Because of the high correlation between IpC and PCEpC, typically only one or the other was 
significant.  Though GDPpC, IpC, and PCEpC were independently significant in many equations, 
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adding controls made them insignificant in the best regression for predicting some spending 
variables.  This was true for Employee Retirement, Housing & Community Development, Social 
Insurance, Veteran Services, & Welfare.  In these cases, the regressions repeat in both tables for 
easy comparison. 
V.1.1. State and Local Government Finances’ Effects on GDP per Capita.  
In the second stage, GDPpC was analyzed in nine independent regressions, one for each 
social spending variable of interest, to see if any of the changes in the current and/or past three 
lags of the residuals of the social spending variables were significant in predicting the Macro 
Dependent Variables (Equations 4-6).  These regressions included fixed year effects and the first 
and second lag of GDPpC, but no other controls.  For GDPpC, only for Education, Housing, and 
Workers Compensation were significant (Table 7, Columns 1-3).   
 For Education, only the third lag of the change in spending in education was significant 
at 0.10%.   This, however, has the unexpected sign of -0.74, or rather, for every dollar spent on 
education, not associated with an increase in GDP, GDPpC decreases by 74 cents.  This is a 
significant difference from a simple regression, which does not utilize residuals; in this model, a 
one-dollar change in the current year of Education spending was a 46 cent increase in the 
change in GDPpC.  Combining the social spending variables of significance together (Table 7, 
Column 4) made education slightly more significant, but once controls were added to the 
equation, Education was dropped all together (Table 7, Column 5).  From this, we can conclude, 
with regard to State and Local Finances, that education, independent of GDP has a slightly 
negative, but insignificant effect on GDP. 
 For Housing and Community Development, we see that the second lag has a positive 
effect of 4.5 at 1% significance and the third lag has an effect of -2.49 at 10% significance.  When 
combined with the other spending variables in column 4, only the second lag is significant.  With 
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controls, neither remain significant.  These effects remain similar when regressing on the initial 
values as opposed to the residuals.  Ultimately, these findings show government spending on 
Housing and Community Development has an overall positive yet insignificant effect. 
 The residuals of change in Workers’ Compensation had a positive effect on GDPpC.  This 
was initially true for the current year, the first lag and the third lag at 1% or less.  When 
combined with the other spending variables and controls, the first lag dropped, while the 
current year had a multiplying effect of 10.9 and was significant only at 10%, while the third lag 
remained significant at 1% with a multiplying effect of 21.2.   The overall effect remained the 
same.  An increase in spending on Workers Compensation, not associated with an increase in 
GDP, results in a very significant and powerful increase in GDPpC. 
V.1.2. State and Local Government Finances’ Effects on Income per Capita. 
Having already accomplished the first stage of predicting social spending variables, the 
second stage process repeats for IpC and PCEpC analysis.  Initial independent regressions (Table 
8, columns 1-4), with no controls, was significant for current Education spending; the third lag of 
Social Insurance spending; the second lag of Unemployment Compensation; and the current, 
first and third lag of Workers’ Compensation.  Upon combining and adding in controls, (Table 8, 
Column 6,) Education, Social Insurance, and the current and first lag of Workers Compensation 
remained significant.  A change in each dollar spent on Education had a positive increase of 
$1.17 in IpC, and a dollar spent on Social Insurance had a positive increase of $21.45 in IpC, but 
both were only significant at 10%.  The only overlapping social spending variable with GDP is 
Workers’ Compensation; the change in spending in the current year had a $10.01 increase in IpC 
at 5% significance, while its one-year lag had a positive increase of $21.63 in IpC at 0.01% 
significance.  Unemployment compensation, without controls (Table 8, Columns 3 and 5), had a 
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negative impact of $1.78 at a significance of 1%.  However, after adding controls, Column 6, 
unemployment compensation became insignificant. 
V.1.3. State and Local Government Finances’ Effects on PCE per Capita. 
Initial results for PCEpC using reduced regressions with no controls (Table 9, columns 1-
6) of the social spending residuals from Table 6, were significant for Education, Employee 
Retirement, Health, Social Insurance, Unemployment Compensation and Veteran Services.  
Besides Employee Retirement, all were significant when combined together and with controls.   
 Again, like GDPpC, Education had a negative impact on PCEpC.  Each increase in dollar 
spent on Education for the current year resulted in a $0.31 decrease in PCEpC at a 10% 
significance.  In addition, Unemployment Compensation also had a negative impact of $1.32 for 
each increase in dollar spent of the current year.   
 Health, Social Insurance, and Veteran Services all had a positive effect on PCEpC.  The 
second lag of Health, significant at 1%, resulted in a $1.67 increase in PCEpC for each change in 
dollar spent that year.  Social Insurance spending, both the current year and the third lag, had a 
$5.00 (at 5% significance) and $7.08 (at 1% significance) increase in PCEpC respectively.  Finally, 
Veteran Services resulted in a large and very significant (0.1%) increase in PCEpC of $23.56 for 
each increase in dollar spent. 
V.2. Federal Aid and Individual Transfer Payments 
Federal analysis, using data from the US Census’s Federal Aid to States and Federal 
Transfer Payments to Individuals tables, mirrors the categories of OECD international analysis.  
Here the variables of interest were Family, Health, Housing, Incapacity, Labor, Old Age, 
Unemployment, and Other.  Results had short-term positive economic effects for Housing, 
Incapacity and Other.  However, Family, Health, Labor, Old Age and Unemployment had 
short-term negative effects.   
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Figure 4.  Federal Aid and Transfer Payments to Individuals vs Same Year GDP, 1997─2010 
 




An initial plot, with no controls, of all federal spending shows a positive correlation with 
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when we control for each state using fixed effects, Figure 5, the coefficient increases to $1.913 
for each dollar of spending while the within R2 increases to 0.3591.  
 




In Figure 6, we can see that an increase in the change of social spending is associated 
with a lower GDPpC of -$2.186 (0.1% significance) for the same year.  Note that Figure 6 does 
not utilize the residuals for IVs.  Though the overall trend seems to be postive, the marginal 
benefit decreases as GDP increases.  The negative impacts on GDP can be due to either direct 
negative effects of federal social spending, where at a certain amount, the poor are enabled to 
remain poor, or because as a state’s GDP declines, the government is stepping in with increased 
social spending.  Further, lags of the change in social spending became insignificant in the first 
and second year, but the third lag had an opposite and very small positive effect of $0.315 at 
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To isolate the direction of the causation, the same methods for State and Local Data are 
used.  The first stage predicted federal social spending categories (Equation 3) using past 
spending, additional independent variables, and lags of the Macro Dependent Variables. Again, 
to avoid correlation and factor out the effects of GDP and Income/PCE independently, the 
regressions on GDP and Income/PCE were done separately (Table 10 and 11 respectively).  In 
this data set, GDPpC was significant for each regression in Table 10 and Ipc and/or PCEpC were 
significant both with and without controls. 
V.2.1. Federal Aid and Transfer Payments’ Effects on GDP per Capita.  
Proceeding in the same manner as in the second stage of the State and Local Data 
analysis, the only variable that had a positive effect on GDPpC, utilizing Equation 4, with Federal 
Data (Table 12) was the third lag of Housing.  With no controls, Housing, at 1% significance, had 
a short-term positive effect with a $10.2 increase in GDPpC for each dollar spent.  With controls, 
the effect increased to $11.2 while the significance decreased to 5%.   
 Spending on Labor, Old Age, and Unemployment all had negative effects within the 
Federal Data on GDPpC.  Labor, without controls, had a negative effect on GDPpC of -$12.36 per 
dollar spent (5% significance).  With controls, this had its significance increase to 1% and its 
effect nearly double to -$21.16 per dollar spent. The standard deviations for Labor, 6.5 and 4.8 
with and without controls respectively, indicate the actual dollar decrease on GDPpC most likely 
lies between -$12.36 and -$21.16.  The second lag of Old Age had a negative effect of -$5.50 
without controls and was significant at 0.1%.  However, it became insignificant when combined 
other spending variables and controls. Finally, only the third lag of Unemployment spending had 
any effect.  In this case it was a -$2.63 (10% significance) without controls, and a -$5.86 effect 
(5% significance) with controls.   
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V.2.2. Federal Aid and Transfer Payments’ Effects on Income per Capita.  
IpC saw positive impacts from Housing, Incapacity and Other (Table 13).  Housing’s third 
lag had a positive impact at $12.65 with controls for each dollar spent and remained significant 
at 0.1% in all regressions.  Incapacity was significant at only 10%; its largest effect was with 
controls at $3.69.  The first lag of Other showed a positive increase in IpC of $1.75 with 10% 
significance without controls, but became insignificant when controls were added.   
Negative effects on IpC came from Family, Labor, and Unemployment; none of which 
had a significance greater than 5% (Table 13).  The impact of Family spending’s 1st lag, 
initially -$2.23 at 10% significance, became insignificant with controls.  Lag three of Labor and 
lag two of Unemployment spending changes were -$8.03 and -$2.07 respectively (5% 
significance).  With controls, unemployment was dropped and labor increased to -$10.96.   
In another approach, the regression is simplified to no Year dummy variables, no lags of 
IpC, and no controls.  IpC is regressed one spending variable at a time on the residuals.  With this 
approach, the only significant variable in predicting income is the third lag of Housing.   
V.2.3. Federal Aid and Transfer Payments’ Effects on PCE per Capita. 
In all cases, except Other, social spending residuals had a negative effect on PCEpC 
(Table 14).  This is true for Health, Labor, Old Age, and Unemployment spending residuals.  Only 
Labor and Other, both with and without controls, were significant at 1%; all other variables were 
significant at 5% without controls.  Old Age became insignificant with controls.   
 A dollar spent on Health or Labor decreased PCE $0.33 or $6.68, respectively, three 
years after the fact.  Unemployment’s second lag decreased PCEpC by $1.04.  Spending on Other 










 This section summarizes the results from Section V into categories of social spending to 
compile and explain the results.  Where relevant, comparisons are made to previous authors’ 
outcomes.  The analyses below pull their conclusions primarily from data presented in Tables 7-
9 and 12-14. 
VI.1. Education 
 Education, as the Federal Government does not fund it, has its analysis limited to State 
and Local data.  Here, changes in GDPpC and PCEpC are negative, while its effects on income are 
positive (Tables 7-9).  Horváth et al. (2014) reference research in which only six of 19 studies 
indicated a significant positive impact on state growth, with the remaining having the opposite 
or no effects – consistent with this study.  Note that the focus of this study is on marginal effects, 
not overall effects.  Additionally, Horvath et al. cited that K-12 spending exhibited no influence 
and higher education showed negative growth.   
 Breaking down State and Local spending into K-12 and Higher education exhibited 
slightly different results for the short term impacts.  Simplifying the analysis and focusing on 
only the education variables, year fixed effects and Macro Dependent Variables, current higher 
education spending is not significant in short term GDP, but its second lag has a positive effect 
of a $1.57 increase for each change in dollar spent on income (p-value 0.072, R2 = .4903).   Lower 
education had the opposite effects, with no impact on income, and a negative impact of $0.83 
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(p-value 0.038, R2 = .3648) on GDPpC for the third lag of K-12 education spending.  The 
individual effect for K-12 and higher education spending was insignificant on PCEpC. 
 The results indicate that additional education spending, in the short term, hurts GDP – 
probably through taxes.  However, when these funds are spent on higher education, the net is 
zero; more or higher quality graduates go into better jobs, stimulating the economy.  
Additionally, education spending increases income with the majority of the impact coming from 
inputs into higher education.  A decrease in PCE could be expected if lower income families and 
students, who receive the bulk of education spending, attempt to save more money for 
additional investment into education.  Though government education subsidies make education 
a realistic goal, where it may not have been before, it does not provide full benefits; requiring 
additional input from families and taking away from personal consumption. 
VI.2. Family & Health 
 Both Family and Health had negative impacts in the Federal data.  Family only affected 
income by -$2.23 per change in dollar spent and only when regressed separately without 
controls.  Federal health spending had a negative impact of about one-third of a dollar, both 
with and without controls, on PCEpC.  There were no significant Health effects on GDPpC or IpC 
in Federal Data.   
Family and Health spending from Federal data is equivalent to the Public Welfare 
variable in State and Local Data, (this includes TANF and Medicaid,) and was not significant on 
either GDPpC, IpC, or PCEpC. The Health var iable in State and Local Data, unlike Federal Data, 
represents public health services and programs other than hospital care.  The majority of the 
spending on hospital services is from Federal aid.   
Other research by Horváth (2014) found health spending, through the Department of 
Health and Human Services, to be negative on GDP, while Furceri & Zdzienicka (2012) found a 
30 
 
positive large effect.  Furceri (2010) also found that health spending smoothed income 
fluctuations.  Here, total public health spending on programs and services (State and Local Data) 
had significant positive effects on PCEpC of about $1.67 per change in dollar spent. 
 A further analysis examines only the Transfer Payments to Individuals as opposed to the 
combination of all federal spending.  By including any significant controls, and utilizing the same 
methodology outlined in Section IV, a result more in line with Horváth (2014) is found for 
GDPpC.  The second lag of health spending (on individuals) results in an increase of $0.98 in 
GDPpC per increase in dollar spent (5% significance, Adj R2 = 0.3453); indicating that government 
run programs have too much overhead or lack benefits associated with the direct payments to 
individuals.  We can see these results in Figure 7 below.   
 




 In both data sets, housing had an overall positive effect on all the Macro Dependent 
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change in dollar spent on both GDP and Income per Capita.  This is true both with and without 
controls.  In the State and Local data, we also found an overall positive effect on GDPpC, but 
only without controls.  This is the opposite of Furceri & Zdzienicka (2012), whose data shows a 
negative small impact on GDP. 
 Supplementing housing may give individuals the chance to make immediate and direct 
changes to their lives.  It frees up income for other needs and allows time to be dedicated to 
other endeavors like education or other areas of human capital investment.  PCE should not be 
expected to change; low-income individuals, who receive housing subsidies, will tend to 
continue to spend their entire paycheck to meet basic needs. 
VI.4. Incapacity 
This facet of social spending includes Workers’ Compensation and Supplemental 
Security Income.  In all cases where significant, Incapacity had positive results, which is in line 
with those from Furceri (2010) and Furceri & Zdzienicka (2012). 
In Federal Data, for the Incapacity variable, we saw no changes in GDP or PCE.  However, 
there was a slight positive effect, but only with 10% significance, on IpC from spending in the 
current period.  The analysis of Workers’ Compensation in State and Local Data further 
substantiate these results with large and highly significant effects on both GDPpC and IpC, but 
no effects on PCEpC.  For both GDPpC and IpC, the current period shows a positive impact of 
$10 per change in dollar spent, but only at 10% significance.  Additionally, the combined lagged 
values of Workers’ Compensation spending is significant at less than 1% and as low as 0.1%, 
depending on the period, with a positive impact of about $21 dollars per increase in dollar spent 
on both GDPpC and IpC. 
Individuals on Workers’ Compensation may spend their income on only necessary goods 
while they search out new jobs, hence the lack of impact on PCE.  Further, giving individuals the 
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time to search out jobs that parallel their skills, instead of settling, not only increases their own 
income, but, according to the data, helps the economy as well. 
VI.5. Labor 
 Federal data for Labor primarily constitutes various forms of workforce and workforce 
education investment.   It has no State and Local Data equivalent.  For every Macro Dependent 
Variable, Labor has a negative, large, and significant effect ranging from $5 to $21.  Concerning 
GDPpC, labor is significant at 5% in the current year only and its impact increase from -$12.35 to 
-$21.10 when controls are added.  For IpC, Labor has an effect ranging from -$8 to -$11 (at 5% 
significance) both with and without controls.  Finally, for PCEpC, Labor’s significance increases to 
1%, but its effect is less, though still large, and amounts to -$6.68 with controls per dollar spent.   
 These effects are not surprising in the short term.  People that are learning new trades 
are less likely to be in the workforce earning income and contributing to GDP.  With less income, 
they are spending less.  These negative effects are in line with both Horváth (2014) and Furceri 
& Zdzienicka (2012).  Any positive effects from labor investment would most likely come from 
long-term benefits. 
VI.6. Old Age 
 Not surprisingly, Old Age had a negative effect – consistent with prior studies.  In 
Federal data, the negative effect on both GDPpC and PCEpC was true for two years after 
spending the money.  Employee Retirement spending, from State and Local data, a subset of Old 
Age spending within Federal Data, also showed a negative effect in the second lag on PCE.   
 Though Old Age spending was highly significant on GDP without controls (0.1%), it 
became insignificant with the controls.  This was similarly true for PCE in both Federal Data and 
State and Local Data analyses, where PCE was significant at 10% without controls and then 
became insignificant with controls.   
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 Old Age spending, though negative, may be far less impactful when put into perspective 
of other spending and social factors.  It is easy to imagine that regardless of who pays, someone 
is paying for the elderly; be it the government or the family.  For example, when the 
government pays for the elderly, this money must be raised through taxes, leaving familes with 
less money to spend – decreasing PCEpC.  However, if old age spending is passed on to families, 
the families will spend their now non-taxed income on the elderly – increasing PCE.  The 
necessity of this expenditure may partially explain why Old Age spending becomes insignificant 
when combined with other factors.  The question left for someone else to answer is whether 
there are any unintended consequences of deciding who funds this expense. 
VI.7. Unemployment 
In Federal Data, we notice short-term negative effects across the board with 
Unemployment.  Meanwhile, in State and Local Data, we find no effect on GDPpC and a negative 
effect on IpC and PCEpC.  Keep in mind the varying definitions of unemployment in the data.  In 
State and Local Data, Unemployment is the money put away each year by each state into a 
trust.  Federal data on the other hand, utilizing the money provided by states, is the amount of 
money provided to individuals and its overhead.  Further analysis of unemployment on GDPpC, 
utilizing only the portion of spending that represents transfer payments to individuals (to 
exclude overhead from Federal Data), gives similar results.  This analysis uses state and year 
fixed effects instead of differencing to predict GDPpC.   
 First, we predict the residuals of unemployment spending using only GDP and its lags 
with fixed effects for states and years.  This has a within R2 of 0.8347.  Using the 2nd lag of the 
residual, also with year and state fixed effects, results in a negative effect of $4.38 for each 
dollar spent on unemployment, a p-value of 0.016, and a within R2 of 0.3015.  This is similar to 
the original results and is visualized in Figure 8 (below) where different colors represent 
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different states.  Running the same variable directly on GDPpC, without the method above to 
isolate the effects of GDPpC on Unemployment, the coefficient increases in effect to -10.31 (R2 = 
0.4815 and p-value = 0.000).  What this helps to show is that GDPpC plays a significant role in 
unemployment spending.  Since GDPpC decreases more when not controlled for, we can deduce 
that the amount of GDPpC does play a role in how we allocate money to unemployment 
spending – a higher GDPpC results in less unemployment spending.  Similar results were found 
for IpC and PCEpC. 
 




 Other social spending includes a number of special projects.  These seem to have 











































-200 -100 0 100 200
Residuals of Predicted Federal Unemployment Transfer Payments to Individuals per Capita (Dollars)
Alabama Alaska Arizona Arkansas
California Colorado Connecticut/Michigan/Oregon Delaware/Minnesota/Pennsylvania
Florida/Mississippi/Rhode Island Georgia/Missouri/South Carolina Hawaii/Montana/South Dakota Idaho/Nebraska/Tennessee
Illinois/Nevada/Texas Indiana/New Hampshire/Utah Iowa/New Jersey/Vermont Kansas/New Mexico/Virginia




$1.70 for both Income and PCE at 10% and 1% significance respectively.  Other special 
programs, like Veteran spending, specifically from the State and Local data, showed large 
($23.56) increases in PCEpC that are highly significant (0.1%).   
 These economic gains are most likely due to the highly concentrated and specific efforts 
and areas that these programs target.  This is opposed to the broad base of other programs like 
TANF or food stamps. 
VI.9. Political Insight 
 This study also garners some insight into the political motivation and timing for social 
spending through Voting Year variables.  In particular, the year just prior to and coinciding with a 
a congressional voting year.  The significance of these years is such that they are not 
overshadowed by presidential elections.  Therefore, congressional representatives are more 
inclined to follow through on promises or pander to the desires of their constituents.  In Tables 
5-14, we find that Labor Spending is positive in both these years, while welfare spending (from 
State and Local Data and consisting of TANF, Medicaid and Social Security Income) goes down 
only during an election year.  Prior analysis indicated that Labor spending has large and positive 
effects in the current year only.  This bodes well for politicians, as they can make a clear impact 
on their constituents immediately through Labor spending while they or their party run for 
reelection.  Welfare spending on the other hand may go down during an election year because 
its effects are less noticeable, as indicated by this paper’s analysis (where we saw no significant 
effects to any of the Macro Dependent Variables), and therefore, after having taken office, 
politicians decrease its spending and redistribute it to other areas.  We also see that 
Congressional Voting Years are associated with positive trends in GDPpC, IpC and PCEpC. 
 In no case was the party in office ever significant in predicting either the amount of any 
social spending variable, GDPpC, IpC or PCEpC.  This is perhaps due to the tempering of the 
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opposing parties in office or even a necessity at the local level to overlook bipartisanship to 
solve immediate problems and not ideologies.  Governor Turnover had negative effects on Labor 
and Other in two periods after coming to office.  This coincides with Labor’s relationship to 
voting years.  Politicians after establishing themselves in office, are free to decrease labor 
benefits for other programs without reprisal from constituents.  Turnover also had positive 
effects on Retirement and Housing in the 3rd period after coming into office; likely, due to the 
time it takes to revamp these programs.  The period after governor turnover had Negative 
effects on IpC; perhaps fueled by an (unnecessary) uncertainty in the economy from newly 
implement governor programs.  Though these ideas are speculation, it is clear that the direction 









 The focus of this study is limited primarily to short-term marginal effects.  To generalize 
the results, Housing, Incapacity, Workers’ Compensation and Other had positive effects, while 
Family, Health, Labor, Unemployment and Old Age had negative effects.  Most of the variables 
were consistent between State and Local Data and Federal Data as well as with prior studies.  
However, differences in the direction of the effect from other studies were found for Health, Old 
Age and Unemployment.  There is a strong and obvious correlation between GDP and total 
social spending, with the causation of the independent social spending variables having both 
positive and negative impacts.  The same is true for income.  PCE tended to decrease with 
increases in social spending.  In the short-term, focusing on incapacity and housing benefits did 
the most benefit for state economies and individual welfare.   
 Note that negative results, such as those for unemployment, do not necessarily indicate 
that all short-term unemployment spending is bad.  Instead, they indicate that this type of social 
spending may simply be above equilibrium.  The same holds true for those with positive results, 
such as Workers’ Compensation; where at some point spending too much may start to garner 
less positive results of even declining results.  Adjusting policy and funds to cope for 
overspending in certain areas and too much prudence in others, may help bring not just higher 





Table 1.  Macro Dependent Variables 
Variable Details 
Gross Domestic Product By state, 1997 – 2013, Dollars 
Income Per Capita By state, 1997 – 2013, Dollars 
Personal Consumption Expenditure By state, 1997 – 2012, Dollars 
*GDP, Income and Consumption data is compiled from tables provided by the Bureau of Economic Analysis. 
 
Table 2.  Independent Variables: State and Local Government Finances* 
Main Category Sub Category % of Total 
Expenditures# 
Definition 
Education All Education 29.29% Includes higher, elementary & secondary, and 
other education. 
Social Services Public Welfare  14.36% Includes: 1) Direct payments to beneficiaries 
under the Federal categorical public assistance 
programs, Supplemental Security Income (SSI) 
and Temporary Assistance for Needy Families 
(TANF); and Medicaid, 2) Cash payments made 
directly to individuals contingent upon their 
need, 3) Payments made directly to private 
vendors for medical assistance and hospital or 
health care and for services and commodities, 
and 4) Welfare capital expenditures and 
employment. 
Health 2.66% Provision of services for the conservation and 
improvement of public health, other than 
hospital care, and financial support of other 
governments' health programs. 
Employment Security 
Administration 
2.45% Administration of unemployment 
compensation systems, public employment 
services, and the Federal Social Security, 
Medicare, and Railroad Retirement trusts. 
Veterans' Services 0.03% Administration of veterans bonus payments 
and other veterans services NOT classifiable 
under Public Welfare, Education, Health, 
Hospitals, Social Insurance Administration, or 




Housing and Community 
Development 
1.48% Construction, operation, and support of 
housing and redevelopment projects and other 
activities to promote or aid public and private 





1.84% Funds held by the U.S. Treasury in a trust 
account maintained for each participating 
government by the cooperative Federal-state 
unemployment compensation insurance 
system.  
Employee Retirement 5.56% Cash and security holdings of government-
administered retirement systems for public 
employees. 
Workers' Compensation 0.51% Cash and security holdings of state government 
compulsory accident and injury insurance 
systems for workers' compensation. 
* State and Local Finance data can be found at https://www.census.gov/govs/local/.   The years 2001 and 2003 do not have state-
by-state statistics available.  The Methodology for Summary Tabulations section, from the Government Finance and Employment 
Classification Manual (http://www2.census.gov/govs/class/classfull.pdf), provided information to consolidate and rearrange data for 
2001 and 2003 to create a state-by-state comparison, however, no CV statistics are available.  The same manual is the source of 
definitions for the above variables. 
# Percent of expenditures represents the mean of All Expenditures for all states for all years of this study (1997-2012) 
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Table 3. Independent Variables: Federal Aid to State and Local Governments & Government 
Transfer Payments to Individuals by State 
Variable of 
Study 
Federal Aid to State and Local 
Governments 
Transfer Payments to 
Individuals 





Social Security Administration  0.002 
DOL - Older American Programs  0.11 
DHHS - Administration on Aging  0.077 
 
Social Security Benefits 28.381 
Railroad Retirement and 
Disability Benefits 
0.65 
Other Government Retirement 
and Disability Insurance Benefit 
0.224 






Special Education and Rehabilitative 
Services 
 0.589 
Workers’ Compensation  0.835 




FNS – Child Nutrition Programs  0.611 
FNS – Commodity Assistance Programs  0.011 
FNS – Needy Family Programs  0.011 
FNS – Special Supplemental Food 
Program (WIC) 
 0.254 
DHHS - Agency for Healthcare Research 
and Quality 
 0.004 
DHHS - Centers for Medicare and 
Medicaid Services 
 9.253 
DHHS - Health Resources and Services 
Administration 
 0.267 
DHHS – Substance Abuse and Mental 
Health Services Administration 
 0.148 




DOE – Vocational and Adult Education 
 
0.097 
DHHS – Job Opportunities and Basic Skills  0.059 
DOL – Workforce Investment 0.164 




Veterans Readjustment Benefits 0.141 






State Unemployment Insurance and 
Employment Service  
0.216 








Community Facilities Grants  0.003 
Rural Housing and Rural Business 
Cooperative Service 
 0.071 
Rural, Regional, and Cooperative 
Development Programs 
 0.005 
Mutual and Self Help Housing Grants  0.001 
Housing Preservation Grants  0.001 
Rental Assistance Payments  0.068 
College Housing  0.002 
Home Ownership Assistance  0.09 
Housing for Special Populations  0.058 
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Table 3 cont.  Independent Variables: Federal Aid to State and Local Governments & 
Government Transfer Payments to Individuals by State 
Variable of 
Study 
Federal Aid to State and Local 
Governments 
Transfer Payments to 
Individuals 
% of Total 
Aid# 
 Low Rent Housing Assistance  0.438 
Housing 
(Continued) 
Section 8 Programs  0.54 
Public Housing (1997 only)  0.379 
Housing Certificate Program  0.601 
Capital Programs  0.145 




Supplemental Nutrition Assistance 
Program (SNAP) [Food Stamps] 
 
0.155 
Child Care and Development 0.228 
Child Support Enforcement 0.136 
Children and Family Services (Head Start) 0.425 
Safe and Stable Families 0.02 
Foster Care and Adoption Assistance 0.277 





Assistance Program (SNAP) 
1.467 








Appalachian Regional Commission 0.005 
Low Income Home Energy Assistance 0.148 
Refugee and Entrant Assistance 0.013 
Tennessee Valley Authority 0.023 
Department of Veterans Affairs 0.046 
 
Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC) 2.015 
Income Maintenance Benefits - 
Excluding Family Assistance 
1.492 
# Percent of aid represents the mean of all Federal Aid and all Transfer Payments to Individuals for all states for all years of this study 
(1997-2010).  Category totals for Federal Aid are in brackets “[…]” in the Variable of Study column. 
Note 1: Total aid does not add to 100%.  Not all Aid from both programs fit into the stated categories.  Total aid analyzed amounts to 
92.28% of all Federal Aid to States and all Transfer Payments to Individuals.   
Note 2: Not all programs span the full range of years of this study. 
Note 3: Data for Federal Aid to States comes from Statistical Abstracts, Section 8, 
http://www.census.gov/prod/www/statistical_abstract.html, while data for Transfer Payments to Individuals comes from Statistical 
Abstracts, Section 11, http://www.census.gov/prod/www/statistical_abstract.html.  For further details on individual variable 
definitions, please see: https://www.census.gov/govs/school/definitions.html, http://portal.hud.gov/hudportal/HUD, 






Table 4. Control Variables 
Category Definition 
Age Distribution Includes two dummy variables: under 15 and over 65.  Constant is all ages in 
between. 
Population growth Change in population 
Race Distribution Vector of percentages of racial breakdown by state 
Educational Attainment Only years available 2009, 2007, 2003, 2000, 1999, 1998, 1997.  Includes high 
school and Bachelors plus 
Labor Force Rate Includes: Men, Women, & Teen 
Unemployment Rate Unemployment ratio for male and female for civilian noninstitutional population, 
16 years old and over 
Exports Foreign exports by state of origin, Millions of Dollars 
Imports Foreign imports by state of destination, Millions of Dollars 
Initial Debt to GDP Outstanding debt in 1997 (from State and Local Government Finances) divided by 
1997 GDP 
Debt to GDP Average Average of Debt to GDP over all years 
Spending to GDP Ratio of all spending to GDP 
Election dummies For who which party controls governor seat for the year.  Constant is Other.  
Dummy for Republican.  Second Dummy for Democrat.  
Initial level of the ratio of total 
social spending to GDP 
Total of all social spending from 1997 (from State and Local Government Finances) 
divided by 1997 GDP 
Race White, Black, Asian, Native American 
TopIncomeShares Values available for top 10, 5, 1, .5, .1 & .01 % of income earners 
Electoral: Voting Year Includes separate variables for Presidential and Congressional voting years.  Also, 
includes cross-section of both. 
Electoral: Executive Turnover Variable with 0 for incumbent still in office and 1 for new governor elected.  
Number increases for each additional governor to serve in the corresponding year. 
Gini Index Index of dispersion of income distribution.  Source: Frank et al. 2015. 










Table 5. State and Local Government Finances – Prediction of Independent Variables Using GDP 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 















Adjusted R2 0.6161 0.4466 .2447 .5054 .2735 .5252 .2177 .4779 0.3846 
Of Interest.D.L1 
-0.5522 -0.2681 -0.2089 0.1272* -0.3224   0.2824 -0.3011   
[0.0360] [0.0360] [0.0398] [0.0380] [0.0376]   [0.0403] [0.0446]   
Of Interest.D.L2 
0.1852     -0.1406 -0.2126   -0.3271   -0.4574 
[0.0451]     [0.0303] [0.0402]   [0.0402]   [0.0330] 
Of Interest.D.L3 
  0.1225 -0.1639 0.1710 -0.1137* -0.2950     -0.0808* 
  [0.0324] [0.0417] [0.0346] [0.0379] [0.0579]     [0.0258] 
Of Interest^2.D.L1 
0.0004 0.0007     -0.0037 -0.0005* 0.0054 0.0002*   
[0.0001] [0.0001]     [0.0006] [0.0001] [0.0011] [0.0001]   
Of Interest^2.D.L2 
-0.0003 -0.0010   -0.0011     -0.0071   -0.0011 
[0.0001] [0.0001]   [0.0001]     [0.0011]   [0.0001] 
Of Interest^2.D.L3 
0.0002     0.0002*         -0.0007 
[0.0000]     [0.0001]         [0.0001] 
IpC.D 
              0.0135*   
              [0.0045]   
GDP per Capita.D 
    0.00636             
    [0.0011]             
GDP per Capita.D.L1 
0.01788         -0.0272       
[0.0044]         [0.0023]       
GDP per Capita.D.L2 
0.0268         -0.0006       
[0.0050]         [0.0024]       
GDP per Capita.D.L3 
    0.0035*     0.0202     0.0016** 
    [0.0010]     [0.0023]     [0.0008] 
Unemployment.D 
                  
                  
Unemployment.D.L1 
          3.2162       
          [0.8049]       
Unemployment.D.L2 
          4.2206       
          [0.7618]       
Unemployment.D.L3 
          2.3938   1.3282***   
          [0.6247]   [0.7078]   
Teen Unemployment.D.L2 
  0.9355**               
  [0.4296]               
 Pop Asian.D  
          29.4793   25.4626**   







Table 5 cont. State and Local Government Finances – Prediction of Independent Variables Using GDP 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
















        -3.3617         
        [0.9437]         
Pop Black.D.L 
      -20.7815           
      [4.5634]           
Pop Native American.D.L1 
  22.6081**               
  [10.7687]               
Pop Native American.D.L1 
  -23.3059***               
  [13.0625]               
Pop Native American.D.L1 
  -51.7298               
  [14.4001]               
Pop White.D 
                  
                  
Pop White.D.L1 
          -9.0296       
          [0.9423]       
Pop White.D.L2 
          -2.4679*       
          [0.7874]       
Pop White.D.L3 
          -4.7884 -0.1486     
          [0.8804] [0.0376]     
Pop 35-54.D 
          -16.6599**   -28.9713***   
          [7.3489]   [14.7749]   
Pop 55-64.D.L1 
  26.0838               
  [4.5500]               
Pop 55-64.D.L3 
            -1.2173     
            [0.2965]     
Pop 65 Plus.D 
        4.2117*         
        [1.3471]         
Pop 65 Plus.D.L2 
    23.5444***             
    [13.4950]             
Pop Growth Rate 
        -1.1219         
        [0.2535]         
PopHSOnly.D 
15.2851*                 
[5.189623]                 
PopBachPlus.D 
23.0431           -0.2048**     
[5.822224]           [0.0905]     
      
 







Table 5 cont. State and Local Government Finances – Prediction of Independent Variables Using GDP 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 















Spending to GDP.D# 
  861.4779 655.8933 982.4824   844.56     148.6685** 
  [100.0864] [82.9215] [141.0865]   [167.1211]     [61.7673] 
Spending to GDP.D.L2# 
  661.9227         21.8462*     
  [130.5992]         [7.8908]     
Spending to GDP.D.L3# 
  580.4008     -63.3903*   28.4879*     
  [125.9116]     [24.0938]   [8.2812]     
Debt2GDP.D 
      194.1547           
      [39.7606]           
Debt2GDP.D.L2 
351.1803   -56.7661**   -16.5180*         
[95.4749]   [22.1210]   [5.8045]         
AllRevenueSaL.D 
    -0.0045             
    [0.0008]             
Gini.D.L1# 
-969.5694**                 
[405.3167]                 
Gini.D.L3# 
              -769.6697**   
              [338.9082]   
Theil.D 
        -15.4579         
        [3.9759]         
Exports.D 
  
      23.3756           
      [3.0312]           
Turnover.L3 
  11.8224*   9.1826**           
  [3.7353]   [3.7327]           
Voting Year Congressional 
        1.9989*     -41.0885*   
        [0.6569]     [13.6723]   
Voting Year 
Congressional.L3 
101.6427                 
[13.5872]                 
Income Shares Top 10.D 
        0.7551         
        [0.1817]         
Income Shares Top 10.D.L1 
      -1.9503*           
      [0.7453]           
# The difference of Spending to GDP represents a ratio with a value between -0.04 and 0.05.  The difference of the Gini ratio has a value between -0.05 and .13. Even with large coefficients, the total 
effect is within an expected range. 
Note 1: Year fixed effects, if significant, included but not reported. 
Note 2: *, **, *** indicate significance at 1%, 5%, and 10%.  Default is significant at 0.1%. The values within “[…]”  are standard errors. 








Table 6. State and Local Government Finances – Prediction of Independent Variables Using Income/PCE 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 















Adjusted R2 0.6612 0.4466 0.2170 0.5054 0.2735 0.6184 0.2177 0.4779 0.3877 
Of Interest.D.L1 
-0.5732 -0.2682 -0.1823 0.1271* -0.3224   0.2824 -0.3011 
 [0.0412] [0.0359] [0.0393] [0.0380] [0.0376]   [0.0403] [0.0446] 
 
Of Interest.D.L2 
0.1220**     -0.1406 -0.2126   -0.3271   -0.4611 
[0.0502]     [0.0303] [0.0401]   [0.0401]   [0.0330] 
Of Interest.D.L3 
  0.1225 -0.0879** 0.1710 -0.1137* -0.2897     -0.0798* 
  [0.0324] [0.0384] [0.0346] [0.0379] [0.0585]     [0.0257] 
Of Interest^2.D.L1 
0.0003 0.0007     -0.0037 -0.0006 0.0054 0.0002*   
[0.0001] [0.0001]     [0.0006] [0.0001] [0.0011] [0.0001]   
Of Interest^2.D.L2 
-0.0002* -0.0010   -0.0011     -0.0071   -0.0011 
[0.0001] [0.0001]   [0.0001]     [0.0011]   [0.0001] 
Of Interest^2.D.L3 
0.0002     0.0002*         -0.0007 
[0.0000]     [0.0001]         [0.0001] 
PCE.D 
    0.0072     0.0399     0.0042* 
    [0.0020]     [0.0058]     [0.0015] 
PCE.D.L1 
          -0.0421       
          [0.0069]       
PCE.D.L2 
0.0391*         -0.0218*     
 [0.0117]         [0.0067]     
 
PCE.D.L3 
          0.0307      
          [0.0059]       
IpC.D 
      
 
  -0.0120*   0.0135* 
       
 
  [0.0036]   [0.0045] 
 
IpC.D.L1 
0.0219295*        -0.0188      
[0.0064]         [0.0037]       
IpC.D.L2 
0.0205*   0.0041*     0.0121*     
 [0.0078]   [0.0015]     [0.0039]     
 
IpC.D.L3 
    0.0031**     0.0118*      
    [0.0014]     [0.0039]       
Unemployment.D 
          2.2054*     
           [0.7301]     
 
Unemployment.D.L1 
          2.7736      
          [0.6934]       
Unemployment.D.L2 
      
 
  1.5050*     
       
 
  [0.5641]     







 Table 6 cont. State and Local Government Finances – Prediction of Independent Variables Using Income/PCE 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 















Teen Unemployment.D.L2  
0.9355** 
       
 
[0.4296] 
       










Pop Black.D     
-3.3617 
    
    
[0.9437] 
    
Pop Black.D.L    
-20.7815 
     
   
[4.5634] 
     
Pop Native American.D.L1  
22.6081** 
       
 
[10.7687] 
       
Pop Native American.D.L1  
-23.3059*** 
       
 
[13.0625] 
       
Pop Native American.D.L1  
-51.7298 
       
 
[14.4000] 
       
Pop White.D      
-7.6401 
   
     
[0.8568] 
   
Pop White.D.L1      
-3.1831 
   
     
[0.7165] 
   
Pop White.D.L2      
-4.9518 
   
     
[0.8200] 
   
Pop White.D.L3       
-0.1486 
  
      
[0.0376] 
  










Pop 55-64.D.L1  
26.0838 
       
 
[4.5500] 
       
Pop 55-64.D.L3       
-1.2173 
  
      
[0.2965] 
  
Pop 65 Plus.D     
4.2117* 
    
    
[1.3471] 
    
Pop 75-84.D   
31.0746** 
      
  
[13.0028] 
      
Pop Growth Rate     
-1.1219 
    
    
[0.2535] 
    
Pop High School Only.D 
10.3650** 
        
[4.8241] 







 Table 6 cont. State and Local Government Finances – Prediction of Independent Variables Using Income/PCE 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 















Pop Bach Plus.D 
15.8781* 




     
[0.0905] 
  
Spending to GDP.D 










Spending to GDP.D.L1# 
2414.913 
        
[515.806] 
        
Spending to GDP.D.L2# 
-1157.247** 661.9227 




    
[7.8908] 
  













Debt to GDP.D    
194.1547 
     
   
[39.7606] 
     
Debt to GDP.D.L2     
-16.5180* 
    
    
[5.8045] 
    




      
  
[0.0009] 
      
Gini.D.L3#        
-769.6697** 
 
       
[338.9082] 
 
Theil.D     
-15.4579 
    
    
[3.9759] 
    
Exports.D 
   
23.3756 
     
  
   
[3.0312] 










     










Income Shares Top 10.D     
0.7551 
    
    
[0.1817] 
    
Income Shares Top 10.D.L1    
-1.9503* 
     
   
[0.7453] 
     
# The difference of Spending to GDP represents a ratio with a value between -0.04 and 0.05.  The difference of the Gini ratio has a value between -0.05 and 0.13. Even with large coefficients, the total 
effect is within an expected range. 
Note 1: Year fixed effects, if significant, included but not reported. 
Note 2: *, **, *** indicate significance at 1%, 5%, and 10%.  Default is significant at 0.1%.  The values within “[…]”  are standard errors. 
Note 3: “of Interest” represents lags of the columns dependent variable. 




Table 7. State and Local Government Finances – Prediction of GDP per Capita 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Independent Variable GDPpC GDPpC GDPpC GDPpC GDPpC 
Adjusted R




















Housing & Community Development Residuals.D.L3  
-2.4874*** 
   
 
[1.3314] 
   
Workers’ Compensation Residuals.D   
9.9284* 10.4395* 10.9343*** 
  
[3.5957] [3.5459] [5.9314] 






Workers’ Compensation Residuals.D.L3   
6.1413* 6.3748* 21.1939* 
  
[2.0563] [2.0264] [5.9815] 
All State and Local Revenue.D     
0.5164 
    
[0.0797] 
Imports.D.L2     
149.7993** 
    
[57.3712] 
Spending to GDP Ratio.D#
     
-108126.5 
    
[13028.25] 
Income Shares Top 10%.D.L     
149.6423* 
    
[50.2221] 
# The difference of Spending to GDP represents a ratio with a value between -0.04 and 0.05.  Even with large coefficients, the total 
effect is within an expected range. 
Note 1: Year fixed effects included, if significant, but not reported. 
Note 2: GDP per Capita lags 1 and 2 included, but not reported. 






Table 8. State and Local Government Finances – Prediction of Income per Capita 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Independent 
Variable IpC IpC IpC IpC IpC IpC 
Adjusted R2 0.4797 0.5046 .4922 0.5279 .5488 0.6799 
Education Residuals.D. 
0.7265* 
   
1.4014* 1.1705*** 
[0.2664] 




























   
5.2475** 5.7132** 10.0133** 
   




   
9.2079 9.5620 21.6323 
   




   
4.1343* 4.0340* 
 
   
[1.4625] [1.4310] 
 
Imports.D.L1      
-82.0429*** 
     
[45.8333] 
Spending to GDP.D#      
-34319.98* 
     
[9937.193] 
Spending to GDP.D.L3#      
-22242.83* 
     
[8339.637] 
Theil      
1481.512* 
     
[432.7402] 
Turnover.L1      
-249.8335*** 
     
[132.5071] 
Unemployment.D.L1      
-125.7806*** 




     
815.8724* 
     
[250.4668] 
# The difference of Spending to GDP represents a ratio with a value between -0.04 and 0.05.  Even with large coefficients, the total 
effect is within an expected range. 
Note 1: Year fixed effects included, if significant, but not reported 
Note 2: Income per Capita lags 1 and 2 included, but not reported 










Table 9. State and Local Government Finances – Prediction of PCE per Capita 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Independent Variable PCEpC PCEpC PCEpC PCEpC PCEpC PCEpC PCEpC PCEpC 
Adjusted R2 0.7272 0.7253 0.7307 0.7206 0.7326 0.7085 0.7438 0.7973 
Education Residuals.D. 
-0.2345***           -0.3367*** -0.3104*** 
[0.1371]           [0.1752] [0.1582] 
Employee Retirement 
Residuals.D.L2 
  -0.8292***             
  [0.4753]             
Health Residuals.D.L1 
    0.8908***       0.9588***   
    [0.5382]       [0.5495]   
Health Residuals.D.L2 
    1.7635*       1.6695* 1.6751* 
    [0.5350]       [0.5368] [0.4790] 
Social Insurance Residuals.D 
      5.5832***     7.4168* 4.9953** 
      [2.8526]     [2.7396] [2.4191] 
Social Insurance Residuals.D.L1 
      -5.1207***     -5.0105***   
      [2.7503]     [2.6498]   
Social Insurance Residuals.D.L3 
      7.1040*     6.5999* 7.0823* 
      [2.3680]     [2.2779] [2.0214] 
Unemployment Compensation 
Residuals.D 
        -1.3543   -1.6404 -1.3156 
        [0.3318]   [0.3258] [0.2890] 
Unemployment Compensation 
Residuals.D.L2 
        -0.6112***   -0.5580   
        [0.3370]   [0.3387]   
Veteran Services Residuals.D 
          11.7698** 24.6306 23.5633 
          [5.8722] [6.9653] [6.3213] 
All State and Local Revenue .D 
              0.0428* 
              [0.0144] 
Theil Index.D.L1 
              3231.897 
              [450.8065] 
Income Shares Top 10%.D 
              44.8560 
              [8.3269] 
Voting Year Congressional 
              753.3457 
              [73.8440] 
Pop Asian.D 
              -190.7788** 
              [86.5403] 
Pop Native American,D.L2 
              292.4115*** 
              [152.6515] 
Pop Native American,D.L3 
              583.8956* 
              [168.8836] 
Pop 65 Plus.D.L1 
              354.8843 








Table 9 cont. State and Local Government Finances – Prediction of PCE per Capita 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Independent Variable PCEpC PCEpC PCEpC PCEpC PCEpC PCEpC PCEpC PCEpC 
Pop High School Only.D 
              37.9349*** 
              [19.3876] 
Pop Bachelors Plus 
              59.5021* 
              [22.1921] 
Note 1: Year fixed effects included, if significant, but not reported. 
Note 2: PCE per Capita lags 1 and 3 included, but not reported, for columns 1-7.  Only 1 lag include for column 8. 
Note 3: *, **, *** indicate significance at 1%, 5%, and 10%.  Default is significant at 0.1%.  The values within “[…]”  are standard errors. 







Table 10. Federal Aid & Transfer Payments to Individuals – Prediction of Independent Variables Using GDP 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Independent 
Variable 
Family Health Housing Incapacity Labor Old Age Unemployment Other 






































Of Interest^2.D.L1   
0.0027 0.0004** 0.0036 -0.0008 
  
  
[0.0005] [0.0001] [0.0007] [0.0002] 
  










Of Interest^2.D.L3    
-0.0014 
    
   
[0.0001] 
    
GDP per Capita.D      
-0.0023 -0.0101 
 





-0.0016*** 0.01181** 0.0010*** 0.0024** -0.0018 -0.0018* 
  




     
-0.0020* 0.0050* 
 
     
[0.0007] [0.0015] 
 
Pop Asian.D   
1.8954*** 
     
  
[1.0072] 
     
Pop Black.D.L       
-14.2964** 
 





       
[0.3952] 
       











    
Pop 18-24.D.L2    
-8.6763** 
    
   
[3.8194] 
    
Pop 65 Plus.D      
11.1302** 
  















      
-17.5364 
 





    
3.0753** 
   
    
[1.3191] 







Table 10 cont. Federal Aid & Transfer Payments to Individuals – Prediction of Independent Variables Using GDP 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Independent 
Variable 
Family Health Housing Incapacity Labor Old Age Unemployment Other 
Voting Year 
Congressional.L3 
    
3.8493* 
   
    
[1.3579] 
   
Income Shares Top 
1.D.L1 
-1.2779** 
       
[0.6416] 
       
Income Shares Top 
10.D.L1 
      
-3.7414 
 
      
[0.8253] 
 
Note 1: Year fixed effects, if significant, included but not reported. 
Note 2: *, **, *** indicate significance at 1%, 5%, and 10%.  Default is significant at 0.1%.  The values within “[…]”  are standard errors. 
Note 3: “of Interest” represents lags of the columns dependent variable. 









Table 11. Federal Aid & Transfer Payments to Individuals – Prediction of Independent Variables Using Income/PCE  
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Independent 
Variable 
Family Health Housing Incapacity Labor Old Age Unemployment Other 
Adjusted R2 .6978 0.694 .7344 .4768 .8458 .9686 .8496 .4012 
Of Interest.D.L1   
-0.7681 
 






























Of Interest^2.D.L1   




[0.0005] [0.0001] [0.0007] [0.0002] 
 
[0.0002] 










Of Interest^2.D.L3    
-0.0014 
    
   
[0.0001] 
    

















PCE.D.L2       
0.0126 
 
      
[0.0034] 
 
PCE.D.L3   
0.0031** 
     
  
[0.0013] 
     
















[0.0006] [0.0011] [0.0024] 
 
IpC.D.L2      
-0.0040 
  
     
[0.0011] 
  
Pop Asian.D.L1   
2.0139** 
     
  
[0.9992] 
     
Pop Black.D.L       
-21.6041 11.1970** 




       
[0.4001] 
       






















Table 11 cont. Federal Aid & Transfer Payments to Individuals – Prediction of Independent Variables Using 
Income/PCE 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Independent 
Variable 
Family Health Housing Incapacity Labor Old Age Unemployment Other 
Pop 18-24.D.L2    
-8.9745** 
    
   
[3.8076] 
    
Pop 65 Plus.D      
9.1472*** 
  















      
-17.8209 
 
      
[4.0552] 
 












      
 
[13.0361] 





      
 
[12.3261] 
      
Voting Year 
Congressional 
    
4.7037* 
   
    
[1.4136] 
   
Voting Year 
Congressional.L3 
    
5.8572 
   
    
[1.5298] 
   
Income Shares Top 
10.D 
      
-3.9734 
 
      
[0.8669] 
 # The difference of the Gini ratio has a value between -0.05 and 0.13. Even with large coefficients, the total effect is within an expected range. 
The difference of Spending to GDP represents a ratio with a value between -0.04 and 0.05.  Even with large coefficients, the total effect is within an expected range. 
Note 1: Year fixed effects, if significant, included but not reported. 
Note 2: *, **, *** indicate significance at 1%, 5%, and 10%.  Default is significant at 0.1%.  The values within “[…]”  are standard errors. 








Table 12. Federal Aid & Transfer Payments to Individuals – Prediction of GDP per Capita 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Independent Variable GDPpC GDPpC GDPpC GDPpC GDPpC GDPpC 
Adjusted R2 0.3585 0.4227 0.3683 0.37 0.4465 0.4809 
Housing.D.L3 10.2099* 
   
11.2011** 11.9583** 
[3.3176] 














   
  
[3.3761] 
   
Unemployment.D.L3 
   
-2.6334*** -6.5972** -5.8690** 
   
[1.3584] [2.5735] [2.5658] 
Gini.D.L1# 
     
-19210.65 
     
[4784.109] 
Income Shares Top 10.D.L1 
     
137.7153 
     
[31.3337] 
Voting Year Congressional 
     
719.1446 
     
[105.1779] 
Voting Year Congressional.L3 
     
824.4604 
     
[162.0569] 
# The difference of the Gini ratio has a value between -0.05 and 0.13. Even with large coefficients, the total effect is within an expected 
range. 
Note 1: Year fixed effects included, if significant, but not reported. 
Note 2: GDP per Capita lags 1 and 2 included, but not reported, for columns 1-7.  Only 2nd lag included for column 8. 









Table 13. Federal Aid & Transfer Payments to Individuals – Prediction of Income per Capita 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Independent Variable IpC IpC IpC IpC IpC IpC IpC IpC 
Adjusted R2 0.4605 0.5101 0.4345 0.4903 0.486 .4607 0.4985 0.5418 
Family Residuals.D.L1 
-2.2303*** 
       
[1.2910] 
       
Housing Residuals.D.L3  
8.2238 




    
[3.4805] [3.4005] 
Incapacity Residuals.D   
2.3035*** 




   
[2.0359] [1.9548] 










    
-2.0717** 
   
    
[0.9385] 
   
Other Residuals.D.L1      
1.7489*** 
  
     
[0.9777] 
  
Pop 17 and Under.D.L2        
313.4193* 
       
[93.3626] 
Pop 18-24.D.L2        
327.1763** 
       
[156.843] 
Voting Year Congressional        
439.3321 
       
[115.6658] 
Income Shares Top 10.D        
93.4253 
       
[23.6831] 
Note 1: Year fixed effects included, if significant, but not reported. 
Note 2: Income per Capita lags 1 and 2 included, but not reported. 









Table 14. Federal Aid & Transfer Payments to Individuals – Prediction of PCE per Capita 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Independent 
Variable 
PCEpC PCEpC PCEpC PCEpC PCEpC PCEpC PCEpC PCEpC 

















   
[2.2085] [2.1146] 
Old Age Residuals.D.L1 
   
-2.2580*** 
    
   
[1.2006] 
    
Unemployment 
Residuals.D.L2 









     
1.7349* 1.4138* 1.3521* 
     
[0.5145] [0.5224] [0.5012] 
Pop Black.D.L 
       
200.3102* 
       
[65.2417] 
Exports.D 
       
144.1453 
       
[38.0712] 
Voting Year Presidential 
       
-863.5265 




       
316.9802 
       
[56.2301] 
Incom  Sh res Top 10.D 
       
70.3423 
       
[10.0792] 
Note 1: Year fixed effects included, if significant, but not reported. 
Note 2: PCE per Capita lags 1 and 3 included, but not reported, for columns 1-7.  Only 1 lag include for column 8. 
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